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This paper examines the perceptions that MBA students hold regarding family-owned businesses 
compared to non-family firms. The study is based on the assumption that attracting talent is 
critical not only for continuous competitive advantage, but also for the survival of family-owned 
businesses. Therefore, family-owned firms should promote themselves as equally attractive as 
non-family organizations, in terms of employment opportunities. MBA graduates represent a rich 
pool of talent that can help family-owned firms to prosper across generations. One avenue of 
inquiry in this regard is to study MBA students and their perceptions. Consequently, studying 
whether MBA students hold a specific image regarding family-owned businesses is brought to the 
forefront. With this aim, the authors engaged in an enquiry process, dealing with MBA students’ 
perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of family-owned firms, compared to non-family 
businesses. The sample was composed of 213 MBA students from 20 different countries. The 
results showed that MBA students do indeed hold a particular image regarding family-owned 
firms. More specifically, some of the findings are that MBA students perceive family-owned firms 
as having more problems within the ownership than non-family businesses, are not as good as 
non-family firms in attracting talented managers, have less job rotation, are slower in their 
internationalization processes, are slower in the implementation of new technologies, have more 
difficulty in issuing equity and the age of retirement is often higher than in non-family firms. 
Limitations of the study and future research are also discussed. 
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ATTRACTING TALENT TO FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESSES:  






A critical success factor in today’s competitive economy is directly linked to the capacity of an 
organization to attract, select and retain talent. Attracting talent is critical not only for 
continuous competitive advantage but also for the survival of a business (Taylor and Collins, 
2000; Barney, 1991). In the past decade, talent has become the key differentiator for successful 
organizations (Bhatnagar, 2007). Therefore, maximizing the acquisition of talent is vital in 
today's highly competitive environment. Moreover, it has been found that through the 
acquisition of talent, employee engagement and motivation improves, resulting in enhanced 
firm performance (Ronn, 2007). In this sense, attracting the ‘best’ employees is a major priority 
for every organization. Indeed, talent management is becoming a top priority for organizations 
around the world. Companies worldwide are turning their focus on how to attract, engage and 
retain the best employees. Therefore, the management of talent now seems to be one of the key 
functions that Human Resource Management is playing strategically in organizations 
(Bhatnagar, 2004). For example, a survey of North American and European executives of 
midsize companies reported that their “most pressing concern” was “hiring and retaining talent” 
(McKinsey, 2004). In a nutshell, talent has become the key differentiator for human capital 
management and for leveraging competitive advantage in today’s organizations. 
Family-owned businesses are often considered as being at the cutting edge of corporate 
performance, representation of the owners’ interests, job creation, wealth development, return 
on investment, quality of product and service, customization capability, and speed to market 
(Astrachan and Carey, 1994; Kleiman, Petty and Martin, 1995; Poza, 1995). Family-owned 
businesses are also famous for their better quality products, which are often a consequence of 
having the family name on the merchandise; this makes them potent competitors within all 
markets (Ward, 1987). Moreover, some of the world greatest companies are family-owned 
businesses and have managed to overcome numerous challenges, such as wars, economic 
depressions, natural catastrophes and adverse changes in markets. Nevertheless, family-owned 
businesses cannot extend and maximize former strengths without attracting and retaining the 
best talent in the world. In this sense, the implications for recruiting and retaining talented 
employees are vital for family-owned businesses; as they grow in terms of scope of activity and 
geographical location, they are in greater need of hiring talented employees, both family  
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and non-family (Klein and Bell, 2007). Thus it is important for family-owned firms to be 
conscious of the image that potential employment candidates have about them, and act taking 
into consideration these perceptions. 
In this sense, building successful family-owned businesses take an immense amount of energy, 
effort and talent. Achieving long term growth and passing down the business from one 
generation to the next and continuing to thrive can only be achieved by attracting and 
retaining exceptional people. MBA graduates represent a rich pool of talent that can help 
family-owned firms to prosper across generations. Therefore, family-owned businesses should 
promote themselves as equally attractive as non-family organizations in terms of employment 
opportunities. One avenue of inquiry in this regard is to study prospective employees, such as 
MBA students, and their perceptions. Michael-Tsabari, Lavee and Hareli (2008), for example, 
found that MBA students perceive the family-owned firm to be more emotional and more 
nepotistic than non family-organizations. The authors also found that, in general, MBA 
students prefer to choose a job in a non-family firm, indicating that the minority of MBA 
graduates will end up working for a family-owned business. Similarly, a study by DeMoss 
(2001) discovered seven myths that, in her opinion, form people’s stereotyped view of family-
owned firms. The study showed that people often view family firms as having little impact on a 
country’s economy, they are in a continuous battle for survival, the family has a negative 
impact on firm value, the levels of nepotism are higher than in non-family organizations, they 
are not good at planning for the future and they have little impact on the society in which they 
operate. Moreover, the author found that for next generation members, working in their family-
owned firms is their second occupational choice. 
From these research findings, it seems that family-owned businesses are generally perceived as 
a unique type of organization, different from other companies. It would be of interest therefore 
to study further, from the point of view of MBA students, what specific issues differentiate 
family-owned businesses from non-family firms. The purpose of this research is to gain a better 
understanding of MBA students’ perceptions about family-owned firms, when compared to 
non-family firms. Why are the perceptions of MBA students about family-owned firms 
relevant? For three reasons: One is that MBA students are highly talented potential employees 
who can be a source of competitive advantage for family-owned firms; therefore to know what 
they think about family-owned organizations may be of great help, to project a better fit 
between the needs of MBAs and themselves. The second is that the information regarding how 
MBA students see family-owned firms may be informative for the development of MBA courses 
a n d  t e a c h i n g  m a t e r i a l  o n  f a m i l y  f i r m s .  T h i r d ,  t h e r e  i s  l i m i t e d  r e s e a r c h  f o c u s i n g  o n  t h e  
perceptions of MBA students regarding family-owned businesses, thus research on this topic 
must be brought to the research agenda. 
Research Questions 
The study was explorative in nature. More specifically, the following research questions were 
assessed: 
What are the perceptions of MBA students toward family-owned businesses in comparison to 
n o n - f a m i l y  f i r m s ,  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o :  a )  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  s t r a t e g i c  c h a n g e s ;  b )  f i n a n c i a l  
performance; c) talent management; d) financial difficulties for growth; e) managing people; 
and f) problems within the ownership?  
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2. Theoretical Background 
Implementation of Strategic Changes in Family-owned Businesses 
Within the implementation of strategic changes there are four areas which, in our opinion, are 
relevant for understanding the differences between family-owned and non-family firms: the use 
of new technologies, diversification, internationalization and building strategic alliances. 
Use of New Technologies 
Regarding the use of new technologies, research has concluded that family firms tend to use 
standard production technologies, rather than more cutting edge machinery (Gallo and Sveen, 
1999). A reason for this may be that family-owned firms tend to seek strategies that are often 
narrowly focused on a single product, within a single market, following the standard 
production technologies that have “always” worked. 
Moreover, several studies have found that family-owned firms tend to show lower willingness 
to adopt new information technologies than their non-family peers (Gallo and Sveen, 1999; 
Ogbonna and Harris, 2005). Likewise, it has been observed that personal perceptions of general 
managers play an important role in their disposition towards new technologies (Ogbonna and 
Harris, 2005). Often when top executives in family-owned businesses, especially the founders, 
advance in age, their level of risk aversion increases up to the point that they generally 
decrease their eagerness to change or implement new technologies (Ogbonna and Harris, 2005). 
From the literature, there appear to be important differences between family-owned firms and 
non-family organizations in relation to the implementation and use of new technologies. 
Diversification Decisions in Family-owned Firms 
In terms of diversification, a number of empirical studies have shown that family-owned firms 
tend to diversify less frequently than non-family firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Gómez-
Mejía, Makri and Larraza, 2008) both domestically and internationally (Gómez-Mejía, Makri 
and Larraza, 2008). Likewise, research on family business has depicted a series of key 
characteristics of this type of organization, which may led us to expect that family-owned firms 
differ from non-family firms in their diversification preferences (Denison, Leif, and Ward, 2004; 
Kets de Vries, 1993). The most well known features are the willingness to maintain family 
cohesion, which derives from the reciprocal involvement of family members within a common 
project, as well as the commitment and emotional attachment to the business (e.g., Gómez-
Mejía, Makri and Larraza, 2008; Nicholson and Bjornberg, 2008; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000) 
and the risk-bearing, stemming from a concentration of the family wealth in a single business 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Mishra and McConaughy, 1999; James, 1999). 
Regarding the first characteristic mentioned above, Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) proposed that 
family-owned firms do not diversify as much, because they are reluctant to loss their socio-
emotional wealth (SEW). SEW is defined as the personal fulfillment that people experience 
through the unrestricted exercise of personal authority nested in family members; the realization 
of psychological needs for belonging; identification and intimacy; the perpetuation and exercise 
of family values; the preservation of a family dynasty; the practicality of placing trusted relatives 
in important positions; the satisfaction of enhancing a family’s social capital; the happiness  
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derived from being part of a tight social group and the opportunity to be altruistic (Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2007). Most family firms perceive the preservation of this SEW as critical. 
Building on the argument above, family firms may be willing to diversify less than non-family 
firms, as a way to protect their emotional bonds within the family and with the business 
project. Corporate diversification often requires the entry of external expertise and capital to 
the firm, thus threatening the power of the family over the firm. In this sense, family businesses 
are well known for the fact that they are less likely to incorporate outsiders’ perspectives and 
opinions in their decision making. 
It is also suggested that family firms may avoid diversification if the firm’s specific knowledge 
of a new business lies beyond the competitive advantage of the family (Stein, 1989). 
Diversifying beyond the family’s area of expertise potentially increases family uncertainty and 
risk of losing the family wealth, which often results in less diversification. Following this line of 
thought, a study looking at the longevity of family-owned firms in Spain reported that the 
oldest family firms in Spain have kept a well-centered position within the market, focusing on 
specific products for a long time (Fernandez and Tàpies, 2008). 
Finally, it is important to note that although we find strong evidence that family-owned firms 
are associated with less corporate diversification, there are cases in which they are willing to 
diversify and when they do, the impact of diversification on firm value tends to be more 
positive for family-owned firms than for non-family firms (Gómez-Mejía, Makri and Larraza, 
2008). This might be explained by the fact that family-owned businesses focus more on long 
term strategies and therefore when they decide to diversify it is because such a strategy will 
increase their wealth in the long run. 
Internationalization in Family-owned Businesses 
Several empirical studies have found remarkable differences in the speed and style with which 
family-owned businesses proceed in their international ventures. More specifically, research 
emphasizes that the main characteristics of family-owned firms are the causes of their slowness 
in their internationalization processes. Some of these features include: the concentration of 
decision-making power in the hands of a small group of family shareholders, and the prolonged 
presence of the same people at the head of the organization, which can make the management 
more rigid (Gallo et al., 2004). 
Likewise, Gallo and Estapé (1992) found that family-owned businesses tend to internationalize 
later and much more slowly than non-family firms. Yet, despite the fact that family-owned 
businesses appear to internationalize at a slower speed, there have been some studies which found 
that an important number of family-owned firms that decide to get into the international market 
make this step once they have reached the end of the first generation (Simon, 1996). Moreover, 
Davis and Harveston (2000), argue that the level of internationalization of family-owned firms 
within the first generation is correlated to the age and education of the founder and the degree to 
which the family firm has invested in new technologies. In this line, Graves and Thomas (2004) 
highlight that those older and larger family-owned firms who are committed to innovation and 
networking and have an orientation towards growth are more likely to internationalize in their 
operations. Likewise, another study by Gallo and García Pont (1996) concluded that the more 
generations involved in the business, the more the owning family is likely to consider reaching a 
market position outside their home country. More specifically, the authors observed that 
multigenerational family-owned firms achieve higher levels of internationalization.  
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Building Strategic Alliances 
Research on strategic alliances in family-owned firms has shown that most family-owned firms 
lack the trust in potential external partners and, therefore, do not pursue alliances with other 
organizations as much as non-family firms (Gallo et al., 2004). Nevertheless, family-owned 
firms in which ownership is shared with non-family members or institutions tend to develop 
the ability to trust other organizations and, when the need to internationalize arises, they often 
seek strategic alliances with other companies and generally form 50/50 joint ventures (Gallo et 
al., 2004). Therefore, it seems that strategic alliances can be a vehicle for internationalization, 
as well as for other processes involving change in the power structure of the business. Family-
owned firms are often not used to working with outsiders and therefore can be more reluctant 
to form alliances. Sharing ownership with outside-family partners appears to be a big challenge 
for family-owned firms, a challenge that, if it is in line with the family strategy, can be a good 
opportunity for the family firm to develop the ability to operate in situations where the power 
lies not only within the family. 
Financial Performance and Family-owned Firms 
Research on this area has found that family-owned firms often outperform non-family firms, in 
their financial results (Saito, 2008). However, some studies have found that after founders 
retire, the results are mixed. That is, the financial performance of family-owned firms, managed 
by the founder’s descendants, is often inferior to those owned and managed by the founder 
(Saito, 2008). Building on these findings, Villalonga and Amit (2006), discovered that family 
management enhances the financial performance of family-owned firms, when the founder 
serves as the CEO of the company or as its Chairman with a non-family CEO, but destroys value 
when descendants serve as Chairmen or CEOs. Moreover, founder-CEO businesses with well 
established control systems are about 25% more valuable than non-family firms (Villalonga 
and Amit, 2006). Using ROA (Return On Assets) measures, it has been found that family-owned 
firms are significantly better performers than non-family firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
Likewise, further testing suggests that greater financial performance in family-owned 
businesses relative to non-family firms is mostly found in those firms in which a family 
member acts as CEO. One interpretation of these findings may be that family members have an 
emotional bond with the business, they understand its purpose and its mission, and therefore 
family CEOs are likely to view themselves as stewards of the family firm. Furthermore, looking 
at the value of Tobin’s q, family-owned firms tend to enjoy about a 10% greater Tobin’s q as 
compared to non-family firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003), making them better in their financial 
performance relative to non-family organizations. 
Talent Management in Family-owned Firms 
Looking at past research, the talent management in family-owned firms seems to be different 
when compared to non-family organizations. In our view, there are nine issues relevant to 
studying such differences: the skills of the management team, the capacity to attract good 
managers, salary and fringe benefits, access to information, stock options, freedom over 
decisions, the selection and training of successors, the quality of the board of directors, and 
representation of the owners’ interests.  
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Skills of the Management Team 
The skills of the management team appear to be better in family-owned businesses as shown by 
research on this area (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). More specifically, it has been shown that the 
concentration of shares and control management, gives the family an advantageous position 
for monitoring the management team of the firm. Since the family’s welfare is closely tied to 
firm performance, family members have strong incentives to monitor the management team 
and push them to be successful at their tasks. Moreover, it has been observed that firms with 
more active involvement of the owners in the management team tend to perform better 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). In this sense, in family-owned businesses, where there is the support 
of responsible shareholders, the management team will likely develop greater skills, resulting in 
increased efficiency and higher profitability for family-owned organizations. 
Capacity to Attract Good Managers 
A critical issue for family-owned firms is their capacity to attract good family and non-family 
managers. For both non-family firms and family-owned businesses, there should be no 
difference of view between the shareholders, in that they want the best people covering the key 
positions within the company. Nevertheless, family-owned firms, differ in the sense that they, 
in addition, often have secondary agendas like maintaining the family within the management 
of the firm and to hold a balance between different branches of the family. Furthermore, in 
non-family businesses the need for recruiting managers is ongoing, while recruitment in 
family-owned businesses is often guided by the cycle of generations. Indeed, this may be a real 
limitation, as outside managers often perceive that a number of jobs in top positions will be 
held by family members, limiting their opportunities for promotion. 
Likewise, a particular strength of family-owned firms is their long term horizon, which is based 
on the willingness to pass down the family legacy to next generations; however the same long 
time vision often does not fit easily with the planning of management careers, a reason why 
family-owned firms tend to struggle more than non-family businesses in attracting good 
managers (James, 1999). Therefore, it is essential that family firms appreciate this situation and 
seek the best ways to attract talent to the business, carefully appointing the right family and 
non-family members to managerial positions. To this end, it is vital to demonstrate that the 
influence of the family will be used to the benefit of the organization and its employees. Also, 
the family business must show their strong concern for the future of the firm, which can give 
managers a sense of security and assurance that they will be able to pursue long term 
professional goals, within a stable business framework. Moreover, family firms must bring out 
their positive qualities, such as the family values and principles upon which the business 
strategy is built. These values are the very reason that makes family firms such a rewarding 
place to work (Ceja, 2008). 
Salary and Fringe Benefits in Family-owned Businesses 
As for the salary and fringe benefits, research comparing family-owned firms and non-family 
organizations has found that family involvement in the firm does indeed have an effect on the 
compensation policies (Carrasco-Hernández and Sánchez-Marín, 2007). More specifically, 
employee compensation at all levels, including salary and fringe benefits, is often lower in 
family-owned managed firms than in non-family businesses (Carrasco-Hernandez and Sánchez-
Marín, 2007). Certainly, family CEOs are paid less and their pay provides less reward for their  
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performance than non-family CEOs. These results go against the notion that founding family 
CEOs use their position to extract extra wealth from the firm through their own salary. 
It is important to understand that compensation systems may vary according to the type of 
firm: a) family-owned and managed firm; b) non-family firm, and c) non-family managed 
family business (where the CEO is a non-family member). Some studies have related employee 
pay levels and ownership structure, showing that managers’ pay level decreases as their level of 
ownership increases, concerning the rest of the employees in the organization (Werner, Tosi and 
Gómez-Mejía, 2005). 
In family-owned firms, there are two reasons that support these findings; the first relates to the 
fact that the CEO is both one of the main shareholders and the managing director of the firm. 
Thus, CEOs in this dual position often set themselves lower salaries (compared to CEOs in other 
firms) and decide to spend more money in the firm where it will enhance the shareholder and 
firm value, thereby increasing his/her main asset (Gómez-Mejía, Nuñez-Nickel and Gutierrez, 
2001). Taking into account that organizations usually aim at maintaining salary differentials 
among employees, the expectation in this case is for a lower pay level among employees. 
In non-family firms, where the CEO is not an owner, and the shareholders are atomistic 
investors, the CEO’s decisions are generally directed toward individual profits such as a higher 
salary (Carrasco-Hernández and Sánchez-Marín, 2007). A common strategy that CEOs in non-
family firms pursue is to increase the size of the organization, which is likely to have 
repercussions on his/her salary and the compensation packages for the employees, making the 
salaries higher in this type of firm. 
In non-family managed family businesses, the CEO is not an owner of the business and the 
ownership is concentrated among a group of family members. In this situation, the CEO’s 
decisions will be monitored by the family and, thus, he or she may have to follow the family 
interests. It has been found that this type of firm offers their employees similar salaries to those 
offered by non-family firms. 
Access to Information in Family-owned Firms 
A firm’s success in today’s challenging competitive environment depends largely on its ability 
to promote open and collaborative exchanges of information among its employees. This 
exchange of information can foster the reassessment of beliefs, generating greater 
understanding of the collective view of the company, aiding to outperform the products, 
services, and processes of rivals. Research in the field of family firms suggests that access to 
key information is more difficult in family-owned organizations than in non-family businesses, 
especially for those employees who are not part of the family (Howorth, Westhead, and Wright, 
2004). The information flow between family firm owners and management teams can be 
affected by the complex entanglement of family, ownership and management systems. The 
ownership system includes three systems: people who are family members, management 
members or both. Therefore, family-owned businesses often present information asymmetries 
between the different systems, with family owner managers, who are members of the three 
systems, having the greatest access to information. 
Moreover, many family-owned businesses are extremely dependent on the “know how” of key 
individuals, especially the founders of the business or people who have been involved in the 
family-owned firm for many years (Westhead, Cowling and Howorth, 2001). Passing this  
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knowledge to individuals who inherit the business is often a challenging and long process; in this 
sense, succession processes may be jeopardized if access to key information is limited to a few 
members of the owning family, especially if there are members of the management team who are 
non-family members and who are involved in the process of passing the baton to the younger 
generation. In these cases, owner managers should make an effort to share relevant information 
to reduce the potential problems derived from the loss of key information and competencies. 
Stock Options in Family-owned Firms 
Several studies in the area of stock options have shown that, within listed companies, there are 
no significant differences between family-owned firms and non-family businesses in terms of 
the provision of stock options (Hirigoyen and Poulain-Rehm, 2000). However, while both types 
of firms tend to restrict the availability of stock options to their more senior management and 
top management people, family-owned firms tend to include a smaller proportion of their top 
and senior management in the population which is eligible for stock options. That is, more than 
40% of top management is eligible for stock options in 67% of family firms and 86% in non-
family businesses. Moreover, family-owned businesses tend to make stock options available to 
a larger population of their middle management and non-management employees than non-
family firms. For example, 16% of quoted family firms offer stock options to more than 40% of 
their non management employees as compared to the 11% offered by non-family firms 
(Hirigoyen and Poulain-Rehm, 2000). 
Freedom over Decisions in Family-owned Firms 
Regarding the freedom over decisions, family-owned businesses often prove to be highly dependent 
on a single decision-maker; generally the main owner of the family firm (Feltham, Feltham, and 
Barnett, 2005). A high level of dependence could be positive for family-owned firms as has been 
suggested by Daily and Dollinger (1992), in that unified ownership can lead to performance 
advantages. That is, when one or more family members have simultaneous roles (owner-father-
president), decision making often becomes centralized. As a consequence, the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the decision making process may be increased (Tagiuri and Davis 1996), due to the 
information availability regarding ownership, family and business; thus, the decisions can be made 
faster and in the best interest of the family and of the firm. Having the goals of the owners, family 
and managers aligned allows managers to act resolutely, making the family firm a powerful 
competitor. Nonetheless, strong dependence on one person or a few family members can be also 
detrimental to family-owned firms, since they often do not delegate decisions to those with greater 
expertise; in these cases dependence can become threatening for the business. Similarly, it has been 
found that dependence on a decision-maker is affected by the age of the founder and the size of the 
business (Feltham, Feltham, and Barnett, 2005). That is, as the owner gets older and approaches 
retirement, the dependence on him or her decreases. Similarly, when the business becomes larger, 
the level of dependence on a single decision maker also declines and thus the access to information 
may be better regulated by professional structures. 
Selection and Training of Successors 
One of the most critical events for any organization is the transfer of power and authority from 
the incumbent to the successor. To choose and train a successor “well” is one of the most 
important decisions a family-owned firm can make. It will have an effect on the family and the 
entire business.  
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In this sense, rather than being better or worse, the selection and training of successors in 
family-owned firms and non-family organizations could be considered as being different. The 
board of directors of non-family firms is free to select successors – from inside or outside their 
organizations – who have demonstrated records of achievements and can step immediately into 
the CEO position, as soon as the incumbent steps out. Moreover, executive successors in non-
family organizations tend to be externally oriented and detached from the business. In this 
sense, non-family firms will tend to train their successors through educational institutions, 
instead of direct interactions such as mentoring and coaching (Fiegener et al., 1996). 
In family-owned businesses, the idea of keeping the business within the family is very strong 
(Ward, 1991), so the board of directors tends to look for successors within the family, although 
where there are no family members available for the position, they often invite an outsider. In 
this sense, when a family member is chosen as the successor, there is no guarantee that he or 
she will possess the talent and experience required to handle a CEO position; thus, family firms 
tend to place more emphasis on successor training than selection. More specifically, the 
training of family firm successors often emphasizes tutoring and mentoring in specific skills or 
knowledge areas, taking a more personal relationship approach that generally involves a strong 
relationship between incumbent and the successor and other stakeholders. Building on this line, 
Fiegener et al., (1996) confirmed that family firm CEOs are able to transmit the strategic vision 
and mission of the business through close incumbent/successor relationships, such as 
mentoring for long periods of time. In contrast, CEOs in non-family firms have less opportunity 
to build close incumbent/successor relationships of the same depth. The close relationship 
between successor and incumbent in family-owned firms is often an advantage over non-
family firms, as successors’ training develops through a lifetime of learning experiences inside 
the business, which will not occur within non-family organizations. 
Quality of the Board of Directors 
Even though the general objective of the board in both types of organizations is the same 
– looking after the stability and the continuity of an organization – the influence of the family 
system, on the function of boards of directors, makes a difference in the way an organization is 
governed. This difference derives from the overlapping roles that stakeholders in a family-
owned firm can have. That is, family members working in a family-owned firm can have three 
simultaneous roles: as family members, as owners and as managers (Tagiuri and Davis, 1996). 
An important feature of the family business government system is that boards of directors are 
dominated by members of the owning family. Often, family-owned firms are reluctant to accept 
outside directors in the board as the family control over decisions may be threatened. Thus, in 
family firms, there is a special relationship based on “trust” between the boards of directors, 
shareholders and the CEO, which creates a virtuous governance circle of trust. In contrast, the 
relationships among the three groups in non-family firms are based on more detached 
connections, which often result in an increase in the differences of interests between the three 
groups. In other words, non-family firm stakeholders tend to seek personal benefit over 
organizational welfare. 
It has been shown that relatives who work together share a sense of identity which often results 
in significant emotional attachment of the family members towards the business, and this can 
satisfy their need for security, belonging and social contribution (Lansberg, 1999). Thus board 
members in family-owned firms are likely to exhibit especially marked levels of stewardship, 
which helps to align the goals of the family, management and ownership. This way, the  
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members of the board of directors can act decisively, as they possess a clear and aligned vision 
of the firm’s mission, principles and values, giving the company a peculiar strength. 
Representation of the Owners’ Interests 
Based on the agency theory, a common problem in organizations is that managers often have 
incentives to pursue their own interests, at the expense of shareholders (Allouche and Amann, 
1997). In family-owned firms, this problem is often mitigated as there is an overlap of family, 
ownership and management memberships. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of family firms, which 
can be a source of advantages and disadvantages (Tagiuri and Davis, 1996), is that the 
ownership and control systems are combined. In this sense, the interests of the owners are well 
blended with those of the management team. 
It has been suggested that one of the reasons why family firms dominate as a form of business 
organization is because owners and managers are aligned along the same long horizon and, 
therefore, they are more capable of overcoming many difficulties faced by companies in which 
ownership and control are separated (James, 1999). Likewise, it has been asserted that firm 
value is reduced when ownership and control are separated rather than combined (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The costs are related to the difficulty of developing contracts, designed to 
completely and accurately specify the particular actions that managers must perform in the 
interest of firm owners. 
Financial Difficulties for Growth 
Difficulties Obtaining Loans 
Family firms are known for their lower ratio of debt, as compared to non-family firms. 
Actually, family firms have the same difficulty in obtaining loans as non-family firms. What 
differentiates them is the unique financial strategy of family-owned businesses, which rests 
upon the idea of avoiding external debt and using internal financial resources instead. 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) found that family firms have significantly lower leverage than non-
family companies. Likewise, Anderson and Reeb (2003) established that the level of debt in 
family firms is generally lower than in non-family businesses. We argue that family members 
represent a unique type of shareholders that posses a special motivation to act as stewards of 
the family firm, nurturing and grooming it, so subsequent generations can receive it and 
continue the family legacy. In this sense, family shareholders will tend to be debt averse, as 
high levels of debt can put the family business at risk. 
Difficulties Issuing Equity 
The majority of companies across the world are family-owned businesses, and much of the 
world’s overall employment is provided by family firms. Some authors estimate that as much as 
90% of all companies in developing countries can be classified as family-owned businesses 
(Dyer, 2003). Most family firms, however, are located at the lower end of the scale in terms of 
size. A study by Pagano et al. (1998) confirmed that a company’s size significantly affects the 
probability of going public for previously private companies; moreover the authors found that 
there are few small companies that go public in order to finance their expansion. Therefore, 
since a large number of family-owned firms do not have the sufficient size to go public, their  
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difficulties for reaching the stock market increase. Nevertheless, if we concentrate on the large 
family-owned business groups, the picture changes and we find that listed family-owned firms 
often outperform their non-family firm rivals in all sectors (Thompson Financial, 2004). 
However, large family-owned firms have, in general, lower average share capital and tend not 
to sell equity to financial institutions or stock market investors who are not family members 
(Gallo et al., 2004). 
As Tàpies and Reinoso (2005) state, there are three main reasons why family-owned firms may 
struggle to sell equity to outside investors. One reason is the privacy loss that derives from 
going public. When going public, sudden changes come to the forefront of a family-owned 
business, for example, the financial situation and the identity of its shareholders become 
accessible; likewise, the discretion that most family-owned firms enjoy is reduced. Moreover, 
the salaries and compensations of the family members become public. 
The second reason lies within the family fear of losing control and ownership power. In family-
owned firms, the financial decisions are strongly influenced by the family and they are 
associated with the need for control and autonomy. This can explain why family-owned 
businesses often prefer to meet their financial needs by using internal funding. 
The third reason is related to the changes in the performance of the business. The performance 
of listed companies is judged by external shareholders, and the top management is questioned 
regarding the dividend policy, the share value and the salaries of top managers, including the 
CEO. In addition, external shareholders will seek to increase the dividend earnings, year after 
year, generating pressure to achieve short term results, which may hamper the long term goals 
of family-owned firms. 
Difficulties Including New Shareholders 
Empirical evidence shows that family-owned businesses do indeed have a significantly lower 
proportion of independent shareholders (non-family members) than do non-family businesses 
(Villalonga and Amit, 2006). A study by Blondel et al. (2001), researched 250 of the largest 
publicly traded companies in France. The study confirmed that, within this group of listed 
companies, where outside shareholders would be expected to be part of the shareholder 
structure, companies where families are identified as the major shareholders form the majority. 
Moreover, Poutziouris (2001) emphasizes that family-owned businesses finance their capital 
necessities firstly by using their available internal funds and then by debt; only as a last resort 
will they look for external shareholders. 
However, it is important to emphasize that, more than having difficulties for accepting new 
shareholders, family firms are often unwilling to accept outsiders into the “family group”, as a 
consequence of their desire to maintain a close ownership strategy. 
Difficulties Retaining Earnings Due to Dividend Policy 
Empirical evidence suggests that family-owned firms have significantly lower dividend rates 
than non-family firms (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Likewise, Gallo et al. (2004) confirm that 
family-owned firms often do not regularly pay dividends. Therefore, family-owned firms seem 
to differ in their dividend strategies when compared to non-family firms, in the sense that 
shareholders often receive fewer dividends.  
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Managing People 
Job Rotation 
Among family-owned firms, there is a powerful recognition that employees represent an 
invaluable competitive advantage that must be nurtured and preserved, in order for the 
business to be successful and long-lived. In this way, empirical evidence suggests that family-
owned firms tend to look after the well-being of their employees more than non-family firms 
(Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2006). 
Family-owned firms also enjoy lower rates of job rotation than non-family firms (Allouche and 
Amann, 1997; Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2003). The lower rate of job rotation represents 
significant cost savings for the company, but more important, it allows employees to stay in the 
same firm for longer periods of time, letting them absorb the culture of the company, become 
more familiar with their co-workers and accumulate more knowledge regarding the company 
and their specific role in the organization. The result is that knowledge is preserved within the 
business and, therefore, people have the sufficient skills to perform their jobs efficiently. 
Furthermore, a lower rate of job rotation represents a sense of security and control for 
employees, which results in people’s willingness to take on new challenges and greater 
autonomy in their jobs. 
Likewise, empirical evidence suggests that family-owned firms are less likely to downsize when 
compared to non-family businesses (Stavrou, Kassinis, and Filotheou, 2006). Family companies 
also tend to maintain stable levels of employment and avoid firing employees, even during 
economic crises (Lee, 2006). From these findings, we can infer that family-owned firms tend to 
follow the intrinsic stakeholder commitment model, proposed by Berman et al. (1999) in which 
firms are regarded as having a moral commitment to treating stakeholders in a positive way, and 
this commitment is in turn shaping their strategy and having an impact on their performance. 
Likewise, bullying at work, which includes harassing, offending, socially excluding someone or 
negatively affecting someone’s work tasks (Einarsen et al., 2003), is less frequent in family-
owned firms than in non-family businesses (Zapf et al., 2003). One explanation of these 
findings lies within the genuine interest of family-owned firms to create a positive work 
atmosphere that can retain employees at their jobs for long periods of time. 
In this sense, family-owned firms often shape their strategy around a set of family principles 
and values, which emphasize continuity, integrity and trust among stakeholders. This way, the 
well-being of stakeholders has an intrinsic value and forms a moral foundation for corporate 
strategy. Their reluctance to downsize may come from their intention to apply and transmit 
their values and principles into the community and to subsequent generations. We argue that 
family-owned firms generally exhibit a sincere interest in stakeholder well-being. Such sincere 
interest has a positive effect on employees, represented by less job rotation and higher 
employee commitment. 
Age of Retirement 
Family-owned business CEOs stay in their position an average of three to five times as long as 
CEOs in non-family firms (Lansberg, 1999; Ward, 2004). Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005) 
pointed out that, in family-owned firms, CEOs stay at their positions a mean of 15 to 20 more 
years than CEOs in non-family firms. This is because the ownership status of family CEOs gives  
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them the power to remain at their job position for as long as they want. Moreover, as the CEO 
tenure often depends on the next generation entering the business and covering the managerial 
positions, they spend longer periods of time in their position. These findings suggest that 
family-owned firms tend to have very long tenures and thus are concerned not so much with 
short term results as profits in the long run. In non-family firms, CEO tenures last for about 
four to eight years (Khurana, 2003). Thus the pressure on the CEO to obtain immediate results is 
immense, and long term strategies that can be advantageous for the next CEO will more likely 
be avoided and replaced by short term focused actions, which can produce quick results. 
Nepotism 
The term nepotism refers to the favoritism shown for relatives based upon family or friendship 
bonds (Padgett and Morris, 2005). The practice of nepotism has been conceived as an 
undesirable attitude by most people (Padgett and Morris, 2005). In order to remain a “family 
business” these firms often need to hire family members to occupy managerial positions. 
Moreover, the blood bonds that exist between family members often lead them to act in favor 
of those who are part of the kinship. Thus, family-owned businesses appear to be highly 
vulnerable to nepotistic practices. Nonetheless, favoritism also occurs within non-family 
organizations. A study by Lowery, Petty, and Thompson (2008) showed that a considerable 
number of employees from several companies in the United States remarked that bonus 
payments were distributed on the basis of favoritism, such as whether they were friends with 
their supervisor or whether their supervisor liked them. 
Empirical findings show that the practice of nepotism or favoritism in organizations has 
negative consequences for employees (Padgett and Morris, 2005); that is, when people 
acknowledge that their supervisor has been hired due to a family connection, they see them as 
less competent, they have less confidence in these supervisors and provide less support to them 
(Padgett and Morris, 2005). Moreover, the perception of nepotism may result in lower employee 
commitment to the business (Padgett and Morris, 2005). Given all these negative consequences, 
all organizations, and especially family-owned firms, should ensure that the practices of 
nepotism are well controlled. In this sense, there are myriad ways to e n s u r e  t h a t  f a m i l y  
members and non-family employees can both thrive and have a healthy coexistence in a family 
firm. To achieve this, family-owned businesses should hire employees based on their skills and 
strengths, as well as the requirements of the job. Family firms should ask themselves what 
qualifications are required by the job position; what type of person should be hired? Are there 
any family members whose skills fit the job position? 
Problems Within the Ownership 
There is much empirical evidence that family conflict is a prominent characteristic of family-
owned firms (Sorenson, 1999; Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007). Authors have gone on to say 
that family firms are “fertile fields for conflict” (Harvey and Evans, 1994, p. 331). Family-
owned firms are more often exposed than non-family firms (Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino, 2003) 
to relational challenges such as sibling rivalries for gaining their parents affection, children’s 
desire to differentiate themselves from their parents, marital confrontation and self identity 
conflict, to name a few. Likewise, there is a wealth of research suggesting that relationship 
conflict, referring to conflict that involves negative emotions like anger, sorrow, worry and 
resentment, is an intrinsic characteristic of family-owned firms (Johnson and Ford, 2000). 
Moreover, relationship conflict has been associated with poor performance in family firms  
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(Dyer, 1986; Gersick et al., 1997). Accordingly, researchers argue that managing relationship 
conflict is very important for the survival and success of family firms (Ward, 1987; Dyer, 1986). 
From the literature, it may be assumed that personal problems within the ownership affect the 
business more often in family-owned businesses than in non-family organizations. Family-
owned firms, therefore, must take a look at their conflict management strategies, i.e., how 
differences among family members can be best handled and resolved. 
3. Methodology 
a) Instrument 
In order to define a family business we have used the definition agreed by both the Family 
Business Network (FBN) and the European group of Owned Managed and Family Enterprises 
(GEEF). A company is considered as a family business if: 
1.  The majority of votes are in possession of the natural person(s) who established the 
firm, in possession of the natural person(s) who has/have acquired the share capital of 
the firm, or in the possession of their spouses, parents, child or children’s direct heirs. 
2.  The majority of votes may be indirect or direct. 
3.  At least one representative of the family or kin is involved in the management or 
administration of the firm. 
4.  Listed companies meet the definition of family enterprise if the person who established 
or acquired the firm (share capital) or their families or descendants possess 25 per cent 
of the right to vote mandated by their share capital. 
A research questionnaire was developed specifically for this study (see Appendix E). The 
questionnaire was based on a review of the family business literature looking at the several 
issues that differentiate family-owned firms from non-family firms. The questionnaire covers 
six different areas: Implementation of strategic changes, financial performance, talent 
management, financial difficulties for growing, managing people and problems within the 
ownership. Participants were asked to respond based on their perceptions of family-owned 
firms and non-family firms in general. 
b) Data Collection 
The questionnaire was pre-tested on ten randomly selected MBA students, to ensure the clarity 
of instructions and questions asked. As a result of the pre-test, the researchers refined the 
instructions and improved or deleted unclear questions. The final version of the questionnaire 
contained 23 items focusing on various aspects of family firms (see Appendix E). Study 
participants were given standardized instructions for filling out the questionnaire. As in the 
preliminary study, study participants were asked to respond to questionnaire items according to 
their perceptions of family firms as compared to non-family firms in general. More specifically, 
participants were asked to rate each of the statements presented to them, in a Likert scale with 
six, five and three response options, appropriate for each case. Moreover, the first part of the  
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questionnaire was composed of questions related to the demographic characteristics of 
participants. The questionnaire took approximately 10 minutes to complete. 
c) Sample 
Respondents were 213 graduate students, enrolled in a two year Master of Business 
Administration program. There were 171 males and 42 females. The average age of respondents 
was 29 years (s.d. = 2,02). Most participants were from Spain (60%), although there were also 
participants from United States, Portugal, Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Germany, India, 
Russia, Italy, Canada, Greece, China, Japan, Taiwan, Ukraine, Venezuela, Croatia and Bulgaria. 
One hundred and nineteen participants considered they had a moderate knowledge regarding 
family-owned business, thirty seven perceived their knowledge about family-owned firms as 
high, while fifty seven described their knowledge as low. Seventy seven participants had 
developed their knowledge about family-owned firms from being members of a family-owned 
business, fifty individuals gained their knowledge through their working experiences in family-
owned organizations, seventy two participants stated that they knew about family-owned firms 
from books, and fourteen participants mentioned that their knowledge about family-owned 
firms came from other sources. Finally, eighty six MBA students were future family business 
owners (next generation members) while a hundred and twenty seven were non-family owners. 
4. Results 
Several interesting findings can be drawn from an inspection of the descriptive statistics (see 
Tables 1.1-1.6 Appendix A). In this section we will summarize the more noteworthy results. 
Firstly, descriptive statistics showed that, for MBA students, problems within the ownership affect 
firm performance more often in family-owned firms than in non-family businesses. Likewise, 
MBAs believe that family-owned firms often have more difficulties in attracting good managers 
than non-family companies. Regarding the level of job rotation, MBA students think family-
owned firms are better at keeping their employees within the firm as compared to non-family 
firms. In terms of international ventures, family-owned firms are seen as slower in their 
internationalization processes when compared to non-family businesses. Similarly, MBA students 
believe that family-owned companies tend to procrastinate more over the implementation of new 
technologies in contrast to their non-family firm counterparts. Referring to going public, MBA 
students perceive that family-owned firms have more difficulty in issuing equity to outside 
investors than do non-family companies. Moreover, MBAs think that the age of retirement in 
family-owned firms is often higher than in non-family organizations. Likewise, MBAs perceive 
family-owned businesses as more nepotistic than non-family businesses. 
In order to study whether future family owners (next generation members) and non-family 
owners differ in their perceptions regarding family firms, the sample was split into two 
groups: future family owners and non-family owners (for future family owners see Tables 
2.1-2.6 and for non-family owners see Tables 3.1-3.6 (Appendices B and C). To assess 
whether the means of the two groups are statistically different from each other, a t test was 
conducted. The t value showed significant differences between the two groups regarding the 
implementation of new technologies (p < 0.05), internationalization (p < 0.05), issue equity 
(p < 0.05), nepotism (p < 0.05), the quality of the board of directors (p<0.10) and access to 
information (p < 0.10) (see Table 4, Appendix D).  
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More specifically, in relation to the implementation of new technologies, future family owners 
are more likely to perceive that family-owned firms are slower than non-family businesses. 
Likewise, regarding internationalization, the future family owner group is more likely to 
appreciate that family-owned firms are slower than non-family companies. As for issue equity, 
non-family owners are more likely to perceive difficulties in selling equities to outsiders in 
family-owned firms, while future family owners perceive fewer difficulties for family firms to 
issue equity. Similarly, non-family owners perceive more nepotism in family-owned firms than 
do future family owners. Regarding the access to information, the non-family owner group is 
more likely to think that the access to information is worse in family-owned firms than the 
future family owner group. Finally, non-family owners perceive more often that the quality of 
the board of directors is worse in family-owned firms than do future family owners. 
5. Discussion 
Maximizing the acquisition of talent is vital for family-owned firms in today’s highly competitive 
environment. In this sense, MBA graduates represent an important pool of talent that can help 
family-owned firms to thrive. Consequently, looking at the perceptions that MBA students hold 
about this type of organization is a paramount issue for family business research. Following this 
line of thought, the present study is among the first attempts to address such an important topic. 
The study has brought to the forefront interesting findings and opportunities to conduct further 
research, as well as information for enriching MBA courses on family business. 
Looking at the results obtained from the perceptual data of the MBA students, we believe that 
they should be of interest to family-owned firms. Having an insight into the “perceptual map” 
of business administration graduates can be useful in the decisions of family-owned businesses 
to reassess the image they want to project to this particular important group of talented 
individuals, as well as to other labor markets. For example, following the results obtained, 
family-owned businesses could take a look at their conflict management strategies – how 
differences among family members are handled and resolved – since the best predictor of 
family business success is not the absence of conflict but its management. Even if conflicts are 
upsetting for family members at the time, they can be necessary and beneficial to a relationship 
in the long run. Conflict is not destructive to a relationship if it is handled and counterbalanced 
by positive emotions, particularly trust, affection, humor, positive problem solving, empathy 
and an active non-defensive listening style. Effective conflict management necessitates open 
disagreement with good communication skills. The building of good communication will 
empower the family to fight for their relationships and for their business project. Family firms 
must, therefore, have a global orientation to see the nature of their family business as 
comprehensible, manageable and meaningful. In this sense, relationship conflicts should be 
viewed as challenges that the family must be motivated to deal with successfully. 
Likewise, considering the negative consequences that nepotism brings in its wake, family-
owned firms must find a way to nip nepotism in the bud. This could be done by framing some 
anti-nepotism guidelines that may be included in the family protocol. First of all, the family 
firm should define job duties and make sure that everyone (family and non-family alike) is 
hired and rewarded based on their competence in accomplishing the business objectives. Family 
members often work in the family firm regardless of their educational background and 
experience, and they usually occupy positions higher than they would do in non-family firms. 
In these cases, the discussion regarding the strengths of each family member and how can they  
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be efficiently applied to the firm is paramount. In contrast to gifted job positions, keeping high-
performance expectation for family members and non-family members will make them develop 
their skills and use them to the utmost. Recent research on positive psychology has found that, 
when employees encounter challenging situations and use their skills to the utmost, they often 
experience what has been denominated as “flow.” Empirical evidence shows that the experience 
of flow strongly influences an individual’s subjective well-being. 
Likewise, the process of internationalization appears to be a challenging endeavour for family-
owned firms. Nevertheless, most organizations now have to think globally if they wish to 
thrive. Therefore, family-owned firms must be able to engage in international ventures when 
the need arises. In this sense, the fact that one or several family members may need to move to 
another country to lead a new business can be a setback for family-owned firms, in the sense 
that family communication and cohesion may be threatened. However, this restricting factor 
can be reduced by enhancing the “endowment” of international attitudes of the family; that is, 
the higher this international attribute, the more it will facilitate the process of 
internationalization. Obtaining these international capacities can be easier if the family 
members, especially the next generation members, are encouraged to learn other languages, to 
travel and to spend some time in other countries. The contact with different cultural 
environments may be an eye opener for the family-owned firm. 
Similarly, adopting new information technologies seems to be a challenging step for family-
owned firms. Nevertheless, they should try to train and modernize their workforce 
continuously. In this sense, family-owned firms must pay due attention to the continuous 
acquisition of new technology in order to be able to respond appropriately to changing 
environmental conditions. They should tackle this challenge by becoming flexible enough in 
their business strategy in a way that continues adding value to the business. 
MBA students perceive that family-owned businesses are considerably worse in terms of 
attracting good managers to their top management teams. It is essential that family-owned firms 
appreciate this situation and seek the best way to attract talent to their managerial positions. To 
this end, it is vital to demonstrate that the influence of the family will be used to the benefit of 
the organization and its employees. Also, they must show their strong concern for the future of 
the firm, which can give managers a sense of security and assurance that they will be able to 
pursue long term professional goals within a stable business framework. Likewise, family-owned 
firms must bring out their positive qualities, such as the family values and principles, upon which 
the business strategy is built. These values and principles can become the very reason that makes 
family-owned firms rewarding and attractive places to work. 
Moreover, family-owned businesses are perceived as having more difficulties for issuing equity 
compared to non-family firms. In this sense, family-owned businesses should be aware that it is 
still possible to manage the business in partnership with outside shareholders, who are willing 
to invest in the business. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that family-owned 
businesses often have a special closed shareholder system, which goes in line with their 
ultimate financial objective: to maximize the value of the company without losing control and 
ownership power. Moreover, the value of a share in family firms is not always purely economic 
but rather involves other motivations like the pride of belonging to the business, the emotional 
attachment to the company and passing the family legacy to future generations. 
The age of retirement in family-owned firms is perceived by MBAs as being higher than in 
non-family organizations; this perception is in line with the family business literature. In this  
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sense, family-owned firms must take into account that the existence of long CEO tenures, can 
result in an over-involvement of the CEO in the firm, which may cause conflict between 
generations, especially during the process of succession. This over-involvement is generally 
more pronounced in the case of a founder, given the great influence that founders have on the 
construction of the firm, and they are usually reluctant to leave their position. In successful 
multigenerational firms, when the time arrives for the CEO to leave, the incumbent and the 
successor share ideas regarding the future of the firm, offer feedback and encourage mutual 
learning. In this sense, the incorporation of the successor in the firm, following a structured 
procedure, as well as the preparation of the incumbent for his or her retirement is vital for 
maintaining harmony within the business, which in turn can make family-owned firms more 
attractive in the eyes of MBAs. 
In our view, family-owned firms should consider overcoming this somewhat negative image 
that MBA students have about them, by emphasizing the advantages of working with them; 
such as the fact that family-owned firms often enjoy lower levels of job rotation and go beyond 
the material needs of employees (i.e., salary, fringe benefits) to fulfill other important needs, 
such as the cognitive and affective needs of employees. Ferreiro and Alcázar (2003), proposed a 
theoretical model of employee needs. They suggest three levels of needs: 1) within the first 
level, we find the material needs. Their fulfillment will derive in employee efficacy; 2) at the 
second level, we find the cognitive needs, which refer to employee training, feedback systems, 
psychological support, empowerment and job enrichment. The realization of these needs will 
lead to an increase on the attractiveness of the job; finally, 3) the third level represents the 
affective needs; justice, trust, self esteem, gratitude and personal development. The fulfillment 
of affective needs will result in group cohesion and mutual trust. From our point of view, 
family firms often pay more attention to the cognitive and affective needs than to the material 
ones. This can be explained through the emotional bond family members hold for the business, 
which in turn leads to an interest in the well-being and happiness of their employees. 
Following this line of thought, empirical evidence has found that material possessions present a 
surprisingly low correlation with happiness (Seligman, 2002). In other words, fringe benefits, 
promotions, and an increase in salary add little or nothing to a person’s subjective well-being. 
Therefore, it can be hypothesized that family-owned businesses, which promote their workforce 
well-being, through the fulfillment of cognitive and affective needs, may outperform non-
family companies that use material rewards as the main motivation for working. 
In this sense, family-owned firms that are willing to attract MBA talent must promote their 
alluring strengths, such as their genuine interest in creating a positive work atmosphere which 
can aid employee retention. As has been discussed before, family-owned firms often shape their 
strategy around a set of family principles and values which emphasize continuity, integrity and 
trust among stakeholders. In this sense, the well-being of stakeholders has an intrinsic value 
and forms a moral foundation for their corporate strategy. We argue that a major reason for 
this unique attitude comes from the love, trust, and commitment of a group of family members 
who have decided to stay together maintaining a long-term view of the business – not just as a 
purely economic asset, but as a legacy that will create wealth for the family and society. In this 
sense, it is important that family-owned businesses pay due attention to promoting themselves 
as attractive employment opportunities. 
Moreover, it is also vital to emphasize that the educational curriculum as a whole should offer 
MBA students more exposure to family-owned firms. From our sample, the great majority of 
MBA students (N=119), considered they had only a moderate knowledge regarding family-
owned business. Therefore it would be useful to select certain family-owned firms as role  
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models and prepare business cases as class material for MBA students; this should offer MBAs 
exposure to family-owned businesses. Likewise, it would be interesting to organize debates, in 
which directors of family-owned organizations can discuss the results of the present study with 
MBA students; this way MBAs will be able to compare and contrast their perceptions against 
the reality of family-owned firms. The more family-owned business cases are discussed, the 
more MBA students will be familiar with this type of organization and consequently their 
knowledge regarding family-owned firms will increase. In this sense, the results from the 
current study can guide the design of business cases and activities, emphasizing the different 
issues that were explored in the study. This can offer valuable opportunities to teach what a 
family-owned-business really is, and to correct the sometimes misleading perceptions that MBA 
students may have of family-owned businesses. 
Another interesting finding lies within the perceptual differences between the next generation 
members (future family business owners) and non-family business owners. Future family business 
owners, in general, appear to have a more positive image of family-owned firms than non-family 
business owners. The differences in perception may be explained by the concept of emotional 
ownership. Emotional ownership has been described as the strong cognitive and emotional 
attachment that next generation members often have for their family-owned business (Nicholson 
and Bjornberg, 2008). When a member of the next generation has a strong feeling of emotional 
ownership towards the family business, he or she often feels a desire to maintain and protect the 
family business, and this may result in a more positive image of family firms. Moreover, the fact 
that future family business owners acquire knowledge about the family business from a very 
young age will likely lead them to have a different view of family firms as compared to non-
future family business owners. Although this can be a good explanation for the differences in 
perceptions, further qualitative research is needed to shed more light on why these differences 
emerge and how they affect the occupational decisions of MBA students. 
6. Conclusions 
MBA students appear to have a less favorable view of family-owned firms than non-family 
organizations. In our view, the perceptions of MBA students should be considered by family-
owned firms as challenges and opportunities for attracting and retaining talent. On the one 
hand, we can observe a series of challenges, depicted by the present study, which emphasize 
that family-owned businesses are perceived by MBAs to have more problems within the 
ownership, are more nepotistic, have more difficulties in attracting good managers, are slower 
in their internationalization ventures, are more reluctant to implement new technologies, have 
more difficulty in issuing equity and the age of retirement is generally higher than in non-
family organizations. Some of these perceptions are in line with the family business literature; 
therefore, creating appropriate strategies to tackle these challenges is vital for family-owned 
businesses if they wish to attract the “best” employees and succeed in today's highly 
competitive environment. 
The study also reported opportunities for attracting talent into family-owned firms. More 
specifically, when they think of family-owned businesses, MBA students see them as better at 
keeping their employees within the firm. Looking at the family business literature, it appears that 
family-owned organizations tend to have a genuine interest in the welfare of their employees and 
are therefore more caring for their workforce. Thus we argue that the greatest drivers of employee 
engagement and talent retention are intangible and mostly related to the way the organizations  
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look after the welfare of their employees. In this sense, this positive characteristic should be 
capitalized on by family-owned firms in their efforts to attract talented employees. 
7. Study Limitations and Future Research 
This study opens the door to future possibilities for analyzing the perceptions that MBA students 
hold for family-owned businesses. Results from the present study clearly depict that MBA 
students view family-owned firms differently from non-family businesses. Therefore, this study 
may be opening a new window to build upon current research and go further in our 
understanding of how family-owned firms are perceived by highly qualified potential employees. 
Researchers in this area could, using qualitative enquiry, further study the differences between 
future family owners’ and non-family owners’ perceptions of family-owned firms. 
One of the limitations of the current study is the cross-sectional nature of its data; thus more 
longitudinal studies should be conducted, including at least two points in time for the data 
collection. For example, it may be interesting to address the students’ perceptions regarding 
family-owned firms when they start their MBA course and then again once they have 
graduated; this would show whether the knowledge they acquire during their course has an 
effect on their perceptions about family-owned firms. Moreover, future research should include 
more women in the sample, as the sample of the present study is largely composed of men; it 
may be interesting to see whether perceptions regarding family-owned firms are different for 
men and for women. Moreover, the results could be further generalized by studying the 
perceptions of MBA students from different business schools, using larger samples of students 
in different countries. Similarly, more qualitative research should be conducted on the topic. 
Finally, it may be interesting and worthwhile to look more deeply into why family-owned firms 
appear to be more caring about their employees’ well-being; this is important in the sense of 
how much an increase of employee well-being contributes to the competitive advantages of this 
type of business. Therefore, more research is needed looking at the factors affecting the 
prevalence of satisfied and happy employees in family-owned firms.  
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9. Appendices 
Appendix A  
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1.1 
Implementation of strategic changes 
Family Firms Versus Non-family Firms 
Frequencies 
  Much slower  Slower  Equal  Faster  Much faster  Not sure 
Use of new technologies  11.7%  51.2%  18.3% 13.1%  1.4%  4.2% 
Diversification 4.7%  44.6%  21.6% 20.2%  4.7%  3.8% 
Internationalization 17.4%  57.7%  10.8% 8.0%  1.9% 3.8% 




Family Firms Versus Non-family Firms 
Frequencies 
  Much worse  Worse  Equal  Better  Much better 
Financial performance  5%  23.9%  35.7%  37.1%  1.9% 
 
Table 1.3 
Talent management in family firms 
Family Firms Versus Non-family Firms 
Frequencies 
  Much worse  Worse  Equal  Better  Much better 
Skills of the management team  2.8%  36.6%  44.6%  14.6% 9.0% 
Capacity to attract good managers  10.3%  68.1%  15.0% 4.7%  0.9% 
Salary 0.9%  37.0%  36.2% 25.0%  0.5% 
Fringe benefits  1.9%  35.0%  33.0% 23.5%  4.2% 
Access to information  8.0%  43.2%  20.2% 21.6%  6.1% 
Stock options  21.1%  47.4%  14.1% 13.1%  1.9% 
Freedom over decisions  8.9%  39.9%  16.9% 24.9%  8.0% 
Selection and training of successors  8.9%  43.7%  14.6% 28.2%  3.3% 
Quality of the board of directors  7.5%  38.5%  42.3%  8.9% 1.9% 
Representation of the owners’ interests  1.4%  4.2%  13.6%  43.7%  35.7% 
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Appendix A (continued) 
Table 1.4 
Financial difficulties for growing 
Family Firms Versus Non-family Firms 
Frequencies 
  Much lower  Lower  Equal  Higher  Much higher 
Difficulties obtaining loans  1.4%  16.8%  44.1%  34.3% 1.9% 
Difficulties issuing equity  4.2%  9.4%  25.4%  51.2%  8.0% 
Difficulties including/accepting new 
shareholders 
8.0% 7.0%  11.3%  47.0%  25.4% 
Difficulties retaining earnings due to 
dividend policy 
9.4%  31.5%  25.4% 29.0%  2.3% 
 
Table 1.5 
Management of people in family firms 
Family Firms Versus Non-family Firms 
Frequencies 
  Much lower  Lower  Equal  Higher  Much higher 
Job rotation  11.0%  60.1%  14.6% 11.7%  10.8% 
Age of retirement  2.3%  7.0%  25.4%  49.8%  15.0% 
Nepotism 0.5%  6.1%  30.0%  41.8%  19.2% 
 
Table 1.6 
Personal problems within the ownership 
Family Firms Versus Non-family Firms 
Frequencies 
  Much frequently  Equal  Less frequently 
Personal problems within the ownership  83.1%  15.0% 1.4% 
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Appendix B  
Descriptive statistics: perceptions of future family owners 
Table 2.1 
Implementation of strategic changes 
Family Firms Versus Non-family Firms 
Frequencies 
  Much slower  Slower  Equal  Faster  Much faster  Not sure 
Use of new technologies  15.1%  60.5%  9.3% 14.0%  0%  1.2% 
Diversification 5.8%  45.3%  23.3% 20.9%  4.7%  0% 
Internationalization 23.3%  57.0%  9.3% 8.1%  1.2%  1.2% 




Family Firms Versus Non-family Firms 
Frequencies 
  Much worse  Worse  Equal  Better  Much better 
Financial performance  0%  25.6%  30.2%  40.7%  2.3% 
 
Table 2.3 
Talent management in family firms 
Family Firms Versus Non-family Firms 
Frequencies 
  Much worse  Worse  Equal  Better  Much better 
Skills of the management team  3.5 %  29.1%  52.3%  14.0% 1.2% 
Capacity to attract good managers  10.5%  70.9%  10.5% 5.8%  2.3% 
Salary 0%  39.5%  33.7% 25.6%  1.2% 
Fringe benefits  2.3%  33.7%  27.9% 24.4%  9.3% 
Access to information  3.5%  40.7%  23.3% 26.7%  5.8% 
Stock options  25.6%  47.7%  14.0% 8.1%  2.3% 
Freedom over decisions  4.7%  46.5%  11.6% 26.7%  9.3% 
Selection and training of successors  7.0%  52.3%  11.6% 24.4%  3.5% 
Quality of the board of directors  3.5%  38.4%  43.0%  12.8% 2.3% 
Representation of the owners’ 
interests 
1.2% 7.0%  10.5%  41.9%  39.5% 
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Appendix B (continued) 
Table 2.4 
Financial difficulties for growing 
Family Firms Versus Non-family Firms 
Frequencies 
  Much lower  Lower  Equal  Higher  Much higher 
Difficulties obtaining loans  1.2%  15.1%  53.5%  26.7% 2.3% 
Difficulties issuing equity  8.1%  11.6%  25.6%  44.2%  8.1% 
Difficulties including/accepting new 
shareholders 
12.8% 5.8%  9.3%  40.7%  30.2% 
Difficulties retaining earnings due to 
dividend policy 
10.5%  32.6%  23.3% 26.7%  2.3% 
 
Table 2.5 
Management of people in family firms 
Family Firms Versus Non-family Firms 
Frequencies 
  Much lower  lower  Equal  Higher  Much higher 
Job rotation  17.4%  57.0%  11.6% 11.6%  2.3% 
Age of retirement  4.7%  7.0%  24.4%  45.3%  18.6% 
Nepotism 1.2%  8.1%  36.0%  37.2%  16.3% 
 
Table 2.6 
Personal problems within the ownership 
Family Firms Versus Non-family Firms 
Frequencies 
  Much frequently  Equal  Less frequently 
Personal problems within the ownership  86.0%  11.6% 2.3% 
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Appendix C  
Descriptive statistics: perceptions of non-family owners 
Table 3.1 
Implementation of strategic changes 
Family Firms Versus Non-family Firms 
Frequencies 
  Much slower  Slower  Equal  Faster  Much faster  Not sure 
Use of new technologies  9.5%  44.4%  24.6% 12.7%  2.4%  6.3% 
Diversification 4.0%  43.7%  20.6% 19.8%  4.8%  6.3% 
Internationalization 13.5%  58.7%  11.1% 7.9%  2.4%  5.6% 




Family Firms Versus Non-family Firms 
Frequencies 
  Much worse  Worse  Equal  Better  Much better 
Financial performance  0.8%  23.0%  39.7%  34.1% 1.6% 
 
Table 3.3 
Talent management in family firms 
Family Firms Versus Non-family Firms 
Frequencies 
  Much worse  Worse  Equal  Better  Much better 
Skills of the management team  2.4%  42.1%  39.7% 15.1%  0.8% 
Capacity to attract good managers  10.3%  66.7%  18.3% 4.0%  0% 
Salary 1.6%  34.9%  38.1%  24.6% 0% 
Fringe benefits  1.6%  34.1%  38.9%  23.0% 0.8% 
Access to information  11.1%  45.2%  18.3% 18.3%  6.3% 
Stock options  18.3%  47.6%  14.3% 16.7%  1.6% 
Freedom over decisions  11.9%  35.7%  20.6% 23.8%  7.1% 
Selection and training of successors  10.3%  38.1%  16.7% 31.0%  3.2% 
Quality of the board of directors  10.3%  38.9%  42.1%  6.3% 1.6% 
Representation of the owners’ interests  1.6%  2.4%  15.9%  45.2%  33.3% 
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Appendix C (continued) 
Table 3.4 
Financial difficulties for growing 
Family Firms Versus Non-family Firms 
Frequencies 
  Much lower  Lower  Equal  Higher  Much higher 
Difficulties obtaining loans  1.6%  18.3%  38.1%  39.7% 1.6% 
Difficulties issuing equity  1.6%  7.9%  25.4%  56.3%  7.9% 
Difficulties including/accepting new 
shareholders 
4.8% 7.9%  12.7%  51.6%  22.2% 
Difficulties retaining earnings due to 
dividend policy 
8.7%  31.0%  27.0% 30.0%  2.4% 
 
Table 3.5 
Management of people in family firms 
Family Firms Versus Non-family Firms 
Frequencies 
  Much lower  Lower  Equal  Higher  Much higher 
Job rotation  6.3 %  62.7%  16.7% 11.9%  2.4% 
Age of retirement  0.8%  7.1%  26.2%  53.2%  12.7% 
Nepotism 0%  4.8%  26.2%  45.2%  21.4% 
 
Table 3.6 
Personal problems within the ownership 
Family Firms Versus Non-family Firms 
Frequencies 
  Much frequently  Equal  Less frequently 
Personal problems within the ownership  81.4%  17.5% 0.8% 
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Mean comparison 
Table 4 
Comparative perceptions of family firms compared to non-family businesses: Future family-owners 
versus non-family-owners. 
  t  value  Significance 
Business issues    
Use of new technologies  -3.041  0.003** 
Diversification -1.504  0.134 
Internationalization -2.159  0.032** 
Strategic alliances  -1.048  0.296 
Financial performance  0.610  0.542 
Skills of the management team  0.963  0.337 
Capacity to attract good managers  0.252  0.801 
Salary 0.171  0.864 
Fringe benefits  1.308  0.139 
Access to information  1.856  0.065* 
Stock options  -1.622  0.106 
Freedom over decisions  0.682  0.496 
Selection and training of successors  - 0.914  0.362 
Quality of the board of directors  1.948  0.053* 
Representation of Owners’ interests  0.280  0.780 
Difficulties obtaining loans  - 0.687  0.493 
Difficulties issuing equity  - 2.059  0.041** 
Difficulties including/accepting new shareholders  - 0.506  0.614 
Difficulties retaining earnings due to dividend policy  - 0.644  0.520 
Job rotation  -1.306  0.193 
Age of retirement  - 0.272  0.786 
Nepotism -  2.071  0.040** 
Personal problems within the ownership  - 1.059  0.291 
 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level.  
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Questionnaire items 
1.  How fast do family firms implement strategic changes compared with non-family 
businesses, related to: 
-  The use of new technologies 
-  Diversification 
-  Internationalization 
-  Building strategic alliances 
a)  Much slower 
b)  Slower 
c)  Equal to NFB 
d)  Faster 
e)  Much faster 
f)  Not sure 
2.  When compared to non-family businesses the financial performance of family firms 
is generally: 
a)  Much worse 
b)  Worse 
c)  Equal 
d)  Better 
e)  Much better 
3.  How good is the talent management in family firms when compared to non-family 
businesses: 
-  The skills of the management team are: 
-  The capacity to attract good managers is: 
-  The salary is: 
-  The fringe benefits are: 
-  The access to information is: 
-  Given stock options are: 
-  The freedom over decisions is: 
-  The selection and training of successors is: 
-  The quality of board of directors is: 
-  The representation of the owners’ interests is: 
a)  Much worse 
b)  Worse 
c)  Equal 
d)  Better 
e)  Much better  
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4.  Financial difficulties for growing: Family firms versus non-family firms 
-  Difficulties obtaining loans 
-  Difficulties issuing equity 
-  Difficulties including/accepting new shareholders 
-  Difficulties retaining earnings due to dividend policy 
a)  Much lower 
b)  Lower 
c)  Equal 
d)  Higher 
e)  Much higher 
5.  Managing people in family firms versus non-family firms 
-  Job rotation 
-  Age of retirement 
-  Nepotism 
a)  Much lower 
b)  Lower 
c)  Equal 
d)  Higher 
e)  Much higher 
6.  Personal problems within the ownership can affect the company’s performance: 
Family firms versus non-family firms 
a)  More frequently 
b)  Equal 
c)  Less frequently 